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It must not be supposed that atoms of every sort can be linked
in every variety of combination. If that were so, you would
see monsters coming into being everywhere. Hybrid growths
of man and beast would arise. Lofty branches would spread
here and there from a living body. Limbs of land-beast and
sea-beast would often be conjoined. Chimeras breathing
flame from hideous jaws would be reared by nature
throughout the all-generating earth.
Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe.
vii

Preface 
Before Life
A vast, sepulchral universe of unbroken midnight gloom and
perpetual arctic frigidity, through which will roll dark, cold
suns with their hordes of dead, frozen planets, on which will
lie the dust of those unhappy mortals who will have perished
as their dominant stars faded from their skies. Such is the
depressing picture of a future too remote for calculation.
H. P. Lovecraft, Clusters and Nebulae.
A planet in the solar system. Dwarfed by darkness, the planet
emits a distress signal in the form of an evolutionary accident
termed “life.” On this green and blue orb, a slow terraformation
of the alien landscape will begin. Deep ravines cut into the
surface of the planet, a boundless ocean now separated by conti-
nents, on which cities and forests intertwine. Beings will colonise
the minuscule unit of space in the cosmos, transforming the
planet into a habitable world. From nowhere, further generations
of living animals will come into existence. There, they will
establish a base on the interstellar ark; both cultivating the land
and fortifying themselves with built structures they will term
“homes.” Here, they will dwell with the assurance that the
planet they have found themselves on is both their origin and
their future. 
An event will occur in the future that will bring about the
planet’s slow extinction. Ten thousand years will pass, and a new
ice age will begin. In the arid deserts of the planet, glaciers will
begin their slow, creeping advance. In time, the oceans will
themselves become frozen landscapes, linking hitherto isolated
countries. Cites that once housed millions of people will become
deserted, and the lights that illuminated the planet will flicker
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erratically in the darkness of night, before slowly but
irretrievably being consigned to total blackness. Of the few who
refuse to depart from the planet, they will remain as scavengers
of a lost world. With the seasons colonized by the unrelenting
cold, farming and all other modes of sustenance vanish. There,
the fragments of a population that remain will establish a new
territory in the ancient forests that have become their new homes. 
Time will proceed, and the ice will withdraw. In its place, the
planet’s sun will undergo its own entropic decline, annihilating
whatever animal life remains on the surface of the planet and
forcing any residual life to seek exile in the depths of the oceans.
As for the rest of the planet, much of it will be covered by dunes,
interspersed with dried rocks and endless horizons of empty
sand. Up above, the blue sky that shrouded the planet in times
long gone will be filled with unrelenting thunderstorms and
hailstorms. Over a longer expanse of time, the oceans that remain
will evaporate, leaving immense basins of dried salt where the
swelling of blue water once existed. The place from which life
slowly emerged onto the surface of the planet will cease to be,
finally dissolving the bonds between life and non-life, and
thereby reducing all matter to an undulating terrain, in which
everything and nothing exists. Everything that exists, has existed,
and will exist no longer bears any trace of its presence. 
* * *
For too long philosophy has laboured under the assumption that
post-humanism, in all its variations, offers us the only escape
route from a legacy of anthropomorphism. Part of this thinking is
legitimate. In the vision of an uninhabitable world, overrun with
ruins and feral vegetation, an entire landscape opens, full of the
possibilities of another philosophy. After humanity, so the
thought proceeds, the world will go on without us, thus
reinforcing the fundamental contingency of our existence as a
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particular species of life. 
This tragic realization becomes the site of a new philosophy.
Whereas the old philosophy found it impossible to envision the
world in a non-sensuous and non-subjective way, indeed going
so far as to align this non-subjective world with naïve realism,
the new philosophy openly asserts the validity of realism and
equally contests any form of antirealism. 
Opposed to the post-Kantian tradition (and for that matter
any philosophy that would emphasize the irreducible centrality
of the subject), the new philosophy takes as its point of departure
the world outside of the subject. Into the wilderness of thought,
objects that hitherto seemed to constitute an innocuous
background to our lives becomes enchanted with a weird aura.
Indeed, the very term “weird” becomes the site of a critical reval-
uation of existing norms, in which the gaze of human subjec-
tivity loses its privileged place. 
Against this horizon of speculation, the phenomenological
tradition, once a beacon of integrity, has become emblematic of a
failure in thought to think outside of the subject. Instead, the
method purportedly reduces the world of things to an anthropo-
morphised world, enclosed at all times with an unbreakable
alliance between subject and world, best exemplified in the
Heideggerian phrase, being-in-the-world.
In the shadow, not only of phenomenology, but also linguistic
idealism and post-structuralism, a call has been made to a post-
human ontology, which delivers us from this obsolete legacy of
thinking the world in terms of how it can be accessed for us, and
us alone. Into this vision, the promise of a philosophy that
replaces subjects with objects finds its inspiration in the image of
a world without us. Aesthetically, the vision merely reinforces
what the new philosophy knew all along: that human beings are
not and never were at the centre of things. To be sure, humanity
persists through this thinking, but only now is rendered ontolog-
ically equal to any other object, be it a carved table or the red rain
Before Life
3
in Kerala. Thus, if humans and the world still exist in a relation
with one another, then the relation is no more special than that
between a forest and the night. 
Today, this promise of a philosophy that replaces subjects with
objects has long since folded back upon itself, becoming a
distinctly human—alas, all too human—vision fixed at all times
on the perennial question: How will the Earth remember us? A
strange impasse intervenes. Despite its attempt to transcend a
philosophy that binds the subject with the world, the new
philosophy remains linked to a glorification of the world that
persists long after humans have left the scene, both conceptually
and empirically. What emerges is a philosophy at the end of the
world, in which thinking gains its power by cultivating the ruins
that outlive this end before then employing those ruins as ambas-
sadors for a lost humanity. 
Yet something else remains in this end. Beyond the ruins of a
lost world, there is a persistence of matter that renders the philo-
sophical apocalypse possible in the first place. If we were to
invoke the Cartesian method of doubt to arrive at a foundational
ground to account for this matter, then we might reformulate the
cogito less in terms of an I think and more in terms of an It lives.
What survives the end is a thing that should not be, an
anonymous mass of materiality, the origins of which remain
obscure. The thing is no less than the body. 
* * *
This book sets out to do two things. One, to redefine phenome-
nology as a philosophical method of inquiry. Two, to demonstrate
phenomenology’s value by conducting an investigation into the
horror of the body. The need to reinstate phenomenology’s
validity is twofold: On the one hand, the renewal is set against
the backdrop of phenomenology itself, as it would traditionally
be conceived and practised by its exponents through the
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twentieth century, and even beyond. In this context, phenome-
nology marks a mode of inquiry concerned with a particular type
of human experience, characterised by a sense of unity and
coherence. From this perspective, phenomenology is specifically
human, not only in its epistemological limitations, but also in its
ethical tendencies. 
On the other hand, the need to redefine phenomenology takes
as its point of departure recent developments in continental
philosophy, not least the challenges put forward by Quentin
Meillassoux. In this reading of phenomenology, the method is
reduced to a concern with access to the phenomenal realm, in
which human subjectivity is placed at the centre, and where a
thinking outside of the subject is inconceivable. While this book
engages with the ideas of Meillassoux, the model of phenome-
nology presented does not seek to define itself in opposition to
this background. At stake is not the question of becoming
complicit with Meillassoux, but of recognising the value of
entering into a dialogue with certain strands of his thinking. 
In contrast to this background, the phenomenology outlined
in this book is attuned to both human and nonhuman entities. In
this work, human experience is a necessary point of departure
for philosophical inquiry. But it is only that—a departure.
Beyond humanity, another phenomenology persists. Far from
being the vehicle of a solely human voice, we will show that
phenomenology can attend to a realm outside of humanity.
Indeed, in this book we seek to defend a model of phenome-
nology that is not only capable of speaking on behalf of
nonhuman realms, but is especially suited to this study of
foreign entities. We will term phenomenology’s specific mode of
accounting for the nonhuman realm, the unhuman. Why this
terminology? The reasons are twofold. 
First, the inclusion of the “un” in unhuman aligns the concept
with the notion of the uncanny. Our account of the unhuman
accents the gesture of repression that is synonymous with the
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uncanny, especially in its Freudian guise. With the unhuman,
something comes back to haunt the human without it being fully
integrated into humanity. In this respect, the unhuman is closely
tied up with notions of alienation, anonymity, and the uncon-
scious (and to this extent, is also registered by the equivalent but
more cumbersome term, xenophenomenology). 
Second, the distinction of the unhuman is that it does not
negate humanity, even though in experiential terms it may be felt
as a force of opposition. As we will see, it is precisely through the
inclusion of the human that the nonhuman element becomes
visible. This does not mean falling back into anthropomorphism.
Rather, it means letting the unhumanity of the human speak for
itself. 
If phenomenology finds itself in an apparent impasse, then it
is precisely because its rebirth is not only needed but also
especially timely. In what follows, the plan is to reinforce the
vitality and dynamism of the method, with a reach that extends
beyond the human body and crawls into another body altogether.
The task, such as it presents itself, is to excavate aspects of
phenomenology that can help us chart the emergence of a future
phenomenology from within the history of the tradition.
An unhuman phenomenology, then, is a phenomenology that
runs against the notion that description is a guarantor of truth,
and thus strikes a discord with traditional phenomenology. In
this way, unhuman phenomenology is a genuine alien phenome-
nology in that it is concerned with the limits of alterity rather
than simply replacing subjects with objects. The germs of this
redefined phenomenology are already evident in the lesser
known works of Husserl, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty, all of
whom are central and recurring figures in this work. Many of
their ideas concerning anonymity, archaeology, and alterity are
instrumental in guiding an unhuman phenomenology to the
shores.
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* * *
To situate these ideas in context will require that we turn to the
affective experience of phenomenology becoming its other. To
this end, our phenomenology focuses on the materiality of the
body before treating that materiality within the framework of
horror. What is the body? On the one hand, it is the site of all that
is irreducibly human—the bearer of value and ethics, and the
means by which our being-in-the-world is possible. More than a
homogenous mass that enables us to get from one point in the
world to another geometrically, it is through the body that the
world gains meaning. On the other hand, the body is a work of
physiology that can be examined in objective terms. Inside the
body, a set of organs can be found, without which our existence
as subjects would be threatened. 
In terms of our idea of what it is to be a self, it is only compar-
atively recently that the body has assumed importance. Indeed,
historically, our conception of what it is to be human has tended
to focus on the singularity of the mind. Thus, in the manner of
British empiricism and Cartesian rationalism, the body becomes
contingent while the mind retains its sovereignty. For John
Locke, this contingency extends to the parts of the body
themselves: 
Cut off a hand, and thereby separate it from that
consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections,
and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any
more than the remotest part of matter (Locke 1993, 182).
Pace Locke, for the most part our attachment to the body tends to
be more than a mere formality. Theoretically, this attachment has
been legitimised through phenomenology and more recently
cognitive science, both of which posit the primacy of the body.
The present work is complicit with the view that body is primary
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in the constitution of self. But in distinction to the classical
phenomenological view that would characterise the body as the
site of unity and coherence here, the body is anterior to personal
history, and at all times in a divisive relation to the subject. 
Part of the problem inherent in traditional phenomenology is
that it has become too comfortable with the idea that the bodily
subject under investigation is a distinctly human body. The
human body, as it figures in phenomenology, tends to be charac-
terised by a sense of ownership and self-identity. It is a body that
carries with it a rich multiplicity of moods, each of which anchors
us to the world. While there is no doubt that such a body exists—
it is reasonable to assume each of us has a relation to one—this
body is not exhaustive, nor does it account for the material condi-
tions under which life emerges. A bodily subject (in phenomeno-
logical terms) is not necessarily a human subject. Another body
needs to be accounted for in phenomenology. A creature that
invades and encroaches upon the humanity of this thing we term
“the body,” while at the same time retaining the centrality of the
human body as its native host. 
By contrast, we would like to propose an unethical body,
anterior to personal identity and prior to cultural assimilation.
And it is important to note that how a living body finds itself
attached to a life is wholly contingent. The particular configu-
ration of the human body is not an end point in history, but part
of a mutating process, which may or may not transform into
another shape. The body to be posited in this book is not only
anterior to humanity but in some sense opposed to human
existence, at least insofar as it destabilises the experience of being
a subject by establishing an unassimilated depth within the heart
of familiar existence. 
It is for this reason that the horror of which the title of this
book speaks is fundamentally a body horror. The affective
response of horror—far from an aestheticising of alien
existence—is the necessary symptom of experiencing oneself as
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other. The point being that the involvement of horror in this
phenomenology is not for the sake merely of countering a
tendency in phenomenology to exhibit the human within the
scope of light and unity. Rather, horror concerns as much the
structure of the human becoming unhuman as it does the
thematic experience of this transformation. Indeed, without
horror, the framework of an unhuman phenomenology would
resist conceptualization altogether.
This horror takes its cues from both a conceptual horror—a
horror inherent in the deformation of phenomenology itself—as
well in the cinematic and literary articulations of such ideas. In
the films of John Carpenter and David Cronenberg, and in the
writings of H. P. Lovecraft, we gain a sense of the body as the site
of another life. If it is a life that manifests in the contours of the
human body, this does not mean that such a life is reducible to
humanity. Rather, the horror of the body marks both the betrayal
of an anthropocentric phenomenology, and (for precisely this
reason) its renewal. In this way, it is only because we begin with
the centrality of the body as a pregiven theme that its eventual
figuration as uncanny, other, and resistant to integration
becomes possible. 
* * *
In what follows, we will explore a phenomenology of body
horror in four ways, marked by each chapter. Each chapter forms
a whole, which loosely plots the origins of the body. Accordingly,
in the first chapter, the relation between the Earth and the body
forms the main concern. The chapter takes as its point of
departure recent findings in astrobiology concerning ancient
Martian meteorites discovered in the Antarctic. These discov-
eries are situated in the context of a late fragment from Husserl
known as “The Earth Does Not Move,” concerning the Earth as
understood phenomenologically. For Husserl, the Earth is not
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just an empirical object in space but, more primordially, a
foundation upon which the possibility of bodily subjectivity is
dependent. In order to address the limits of such a phenome-
nology, we will consider some recent findings in astrobiology,
which are suggestive of the possibility that life on Earth may
have had its origins elsewhere in the solar system. Even at a
hypothetical level, what these findings suggest is that our under-
standing of the human-Earth relation needs to accommodate the
notion that the origin of life is not grounded in a transcendental
structure, as Husserl has it, but instead involves the notion of life
as, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, a “metamorphosis” rather
than “beginning from zero” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 268). To flesh
this claim out, reference is made to Quatermass and the Pit
directed by Roy Ward Baker (1967). This film is exemplary in
articulating the anterior origins of the human body at both a
conceptual and imaginary level. 
In the second chapter, the theme of the alien Earth is inter-
woven with the origin of the body itself. To chart the emergence of
the body, we turn to Levinas. Emmanuel Levinas is often thought
of as a philosopher of ethics, above all else. Indeed, his notions of
the face, the Other, and alterity have all earned him a distinguished
place in the history of phenomenology as a fundamental thinker of
ethics as a first philosophy. But what has been overlooked in this
attention on ethics is the early work of Levinas, which reveals him
less as a philosopher of the Other and more as a philosopher of
elemental and anonymous being. Two claims are made: First,
Levinas’s idea of the “il y a” (the there is) offers us a way of
rethinking the relation between the body and the world. This idea
can be approached by phrasing Levinas as a materialist. Second,
the experience of horror, on which Levinas will place great
emphasis, provides us with a phenomenology at the threshold of
experience. As we will see, it is precisely through what Levinas
terms “the horror of the night,” that phenomenology begins to
exceed its methodological constraints in accounting for a plane of
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elemental existence beyond experience. Through this, a phenome-
nological realism can be developed, with the materiality of the
body, above all, coming to surface as an existence that both enables
and exceeds subjectivity. These ontological notions are played out
in the work of Andrei Tarkovsky, especially his early film, Solaris
(1972). It is in this film that we can witness the Levinasian account
of the body as constitutive of subjectivity but at the same time a
betrayer of subjectivity. 
If the first part of the book focuses on the emergence of life on
Earth, then the second part focuses on the specific life that
inheres in the human body. Thus, the aim of the third chapter is
to give an account of the prehistory specific to the human body.
This is achieved by pairing Merleau-Ponty and Lovecraft in
dialogue with one another, specifically Lovecraft’s seminal story,
The Shadow Out of Time. With recourse to Merleau-Ponty, we will
see that Lovecraft’s story shows us two things about alien subjec-
tivity: First, constitutionally, the human subject can be seen as
“sharing” its bodily experience with a prehistoric subject. In
Lovecraft’s tale, the horror central to the narrative centres on the
struggle between the body as possessor of the subject and the
body as possessed by the subject. Second, temporally, this prehis-
toric constitution sets in place a body out of joint. This focus on
the temporality of the alien subject throws into doubt traditional
notions of personal identity as relying on the continuity of
personal memory and instead raises the spectre of phylogenetic
memory. Such themes are then analysed in their cinematic
appearance in the works of David Cronenberg and John
Carpenter. 
The final chapter confronts a series of critiques posited in
contemporary continental philosophy concerning whether
phenomenology can account for non-human things. In
particular, this issue is taken up through introducing
Meillassoux’s notions of “arche fossils” and “ancestrality” into
the discussion. Meillassoux’s ideas are important because they
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problematize access to things “anterior even to the emergence of
life.” In his view, correlationism is only able to derive knowledge
of the past from the standpoint of the present, thus rendering the
phenomenologist (by implication) the guarantor of knowledge
“for us.” By engaging with Meillassoux’s critique of phenome-
nology, a counter-argument is formulated based on Merleau-
Ponty’s late ontology of the flesh. What Merleau-Ponty shows us
is that our value-laden narcissistic reflection on our place in the
universe is offset by the collapse of conceptual thought. Through
this collapse, the elemental foundation of what he terms “the
flesh” is proven to be ontologically prior to correlationism in the
first instance. In turn, we will employ Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
the flesh to stage a debate with Meillassoux’s idea of “arche
fossils.” 
If these concepts are resistant to experience, then they can
nevertheless be approached through an indirect route; namely,
that of the cinematic image. Accordingly, in the conclusion of this
book, we turn to John Carpenter’s seminal film, The Thing (1982).
Carpenter’s film—and his vision more broadly—is essential in
allowing us to formulate the central thesis of the book, namely:
the horror of the cosmos is essentially the horror of the body. Our point
of departure for examining Carpenter’s film is that the abject
creature in the film is an expression of the origin of life itself. This
is evident in that the body can be seen as being constituted not
only in structural terms by an alien subjectivity, but in thematic
terms by an anonymous teleology, the implication being that the
origin of the universe is both constitutive of humanity and also
against humanity. 
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